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Beyond the vertical? Using value chains and governance as a
framework to analyse private standards initiatives in agri-food
chains
Trade in agrifood products is increasingly characterised by global supply chains
dominated by agribusiness that require suppliers to comply with an ever-growing set
of standards to secure access to markets. Often, these standards take the form of
voluntary standards and codes developed and overseen by new constellations of actors
from the private and non-governmental sectors, working in collaboration in private
standards initiatives (PSIs). PSIs represent a new form of agrifood governance which
present questions related to sustainability and democratic legitimacy.
What is particularly interesting is that PSIs are now emerging in the global South as
well as the North where, in the context of managing risk in global chains, they were
first initiated. Southern PSIs focusing on food safety and quality include ChileGAP
and KenyaGAP, where producers have developed their own interpretation of Good
Agricultural Practice which they have benchmarked to the GlobalGAP protocol
(Garbutt and Coetzer 2005; Garbutt 2007). There are also examples of southern PSIs
in the field of labour codes of practice, such as the Wine Industry Ethical Trade
Association (WIETA) in South Africa and Horticulture Ethical Business Initiative
(HEBI) in Kenya (Barrientos 2007; Dolan and Opondo 2005).
There has been very little empirical analysis of PSIs located in the global South. This
paper draws on preliminary findings from an ongoing project on private standards in
the agrifood chain in the horticulture sector in Kenya where leading European
retailers and other key buyers are sourcing cut flowers and vegetables in order to
contribute to filling this empirical gap.1 Our framework for analysis of PSIs (set out
originally in Tallontire 2007) focuses on governance and potential institutional
impacts within the agri-food sector using an extended form of value chain analysis
(VCA) which emphasises ‘horizontal’ as well as ‘vertical’ dimensions of governance.
By this we mean that the framework looks beyond actors directly involved in
commodity exchange and includes the range of actors that may govern value chains
and related standards beyond buyers and suppliers such as civil society organisations,
donors and workers and their representatives. We compare the horizontal and vertical
governance aspects of two locally based private standards initiatives that have
emerged in the agrifood sector in Kenya: the Horticulture Ethical Business Initiative
(HEBI) and KenyaGAP, with respect to the way in which standards are developed and
1 The authors gratefully acknowledge funding from the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council
and Department for International Development, for the project Governance Implications of Private
Standards Initiatives in Agri-Food Chains, grant ref: RES-167-25-0195.
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by whom (legislative governance), how compliance is monitored and assessed
(judicial governance) and processes of standard implementation and the different tools
that are used by the PSI to ensure that standards are met (executive governance).
The Kenyan horticulture sector is an interesting locus for this research due to the keen
interest of donors, the institutional experimentation that has been undertaken and the
importance of the sector to the country’s exports. In this paper we have considered
two PSIs together, not only because they are operating in the same sector in the same
country and are therefore inter-related, but also because it helps to put the relative
success or failure of the different initiatives into context of the wider structural
dynamics evident in the chain.
We start by briefly discussing the growth and origins of PSIs in agri-food chains. Our
conceptual framework is then set out. Next we explore the different dimensions of
governance at play in two Kenyan PSIs drawing on the empirical research we have
undertaken in Kenya and in Europe. The concluding section reflects on the dynamics
of governance in the two initiatives and the way in which different kinds of power
have shaped the stories of the initiatives. We argue that one needs to look beyond the
vertical aspects of governance, to explore the role of actors outside of the value chain
to fully appreciate the potential role of southern PSIs. However, our analysis
indicates that the extension of governance ‘beyond the vertical’ is limited to only
certain aspects of governance. Moreover, whilst PSIs may offer potential for
standards to be developed, meet the needs of and be applicable to a wider range of
stakeholders, much of the power resides with actors downstream, that is the buyers.
Private forms of regulation in agri-food chains
The use of private forms of regulation such as standards has become a hot topic in
agrifood, trade and value chains literature in which the increasing significance of
private standards in comparison to public standards, in developed and developing
countries, has been mapped (for example by Giovannucci and Ponte 2005; Busch and
Bain 2004; Henson and Reardon 2005). There has been considerable discussion
about the use of private standard by supermarkets in the context of their global
sourcing policies (Vorley 2003; Dolan and Humphrey 2000; Busch et al 2005).
Important developments have been the insistence by certain retailers that suppliers are
certified against the GlobalGAP2 standard or other standards for good agricultural
practice as part of their efforts to ensure the supply of safe food to consumers
(Humphrey 2006) and, in certain markets, increased vigilance with regard to the
welfare of workers and adherence to labour rights, particularly the UK where several
supermarkets are members of the Ethical Trading Initiative3 (Barrientos 2007; Hughes
2Until recently known as EurepGAP, this initiative started in 1997 when retailers belonging to the
Euro-Retailer Produce Working Group (EUREP) to develop standards for Good Agricultural Practice
(GAP). In particular European markets, notably the UK and the Netherlands, it has become the
minimum requirement for producers wishing to sell through the multiple retailers. .
3 The ETI is ‘an alliance of companies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and trade union
organisations’ which aims ‘to promote and improve the implementation of corporate codes of practice
which cover supply chain working conditions’ (www.ethicaltrade.org).
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et al 2007). As Giovannucci and Ponte note, ‘standards are thus being set outside the
classic boundaries of governmental and intergovernmental authority and through
amorphous alliances of corporations, NGOs, and civil society groups that tend to
reach agreements on the model of collective bargaining’ (Giovanucci and Ponte 2005:
298).4
Private Standards Initiatives in the South5
The emergence of southern-based PSIs has been cheered enthusiastically from many
quarters. For some, private standards could be usefully aligned with public sector
monitoring and enforcement functions for reasons of efficiency or to take advantage
of potential creative synergies between private and public standards development,
inspection and sanctions systems (FIAS 2005). Enthusiasm for PSIs has come from
another quarter, founded upon their potential, especially when they involve a variety
of stakeholders, localising standards, improving farmer and worker well-being and
providing a space for participation for previously unheard groups (NRET 2002;
Barrientos, Dolan and Tallontire 2003; Pattberg 2006), and thereby embodying
deliberative democracy (Fuchs and Kalfagianni forthcoming). O’Rourke summarises
the potential in particular of non-governmental forms of regulation: ‘they offer the
potential of opening up and strengthening regulatory systems, and bringing in new
voices and mechanisms for motivating improvements in global supply chains’
(O’Rourke 2006: 911).
However, some warnings have been sounded with respect to the power that private
initiatives embody. They may be an instrument through which the private sector can,
in the words of Busch and Bain ‘reorganize aspects of the market to better suit its
needs’ in the context of a retreating state (2004: 322). Utting warns that structural
factors, specifically ‘ongoing economic liberalization’, are likely to play an important
role in shaping the nature of the regulation of business (2005: iii). Purchasing
practices and supply chain management in agri-food chains are likely to affect the
way in which rules are formulated and put into practice (Taylor 2005; Raworth 2004).
Retailers for example maintain control through discursive power to frame the debate
and have ‘the power to determine which stakeholders are called to the bargaining
table and whose voices are validated’ (Dolan and Opondo 2005: 97) and there are
risks that ‘local multi-stakeholder approaches may simply replicate and reinforce local
gender norms’ (Tallontire, Dolan, Smith and Barrientos 2005: 569). Indeed even the
optimism about PSIs is often hedged and subject to numerous case-specific caveats.
The potential of PSIs, whether to improve efficiency or governance, is conditional and
largely untested (Courville 2003; O’Rourke 2003). Importantly, there is a dearth of
empirical understanding in a Southern as opposed to a Northern context and beyond
international standards.
4 We are using the term ‘private standards’ to cover all standards set outside the realms of public sector.
We have included ‘multi-stakeholder’ initiatives under the broad rubric of private standards initiatives
to distinguish them clearly from mandatory standards and so permit analysis of the extent to which
initiatives permit true multi-stakeholder dialogue and action.
5 This section draws considerably from Tallontire 2007 where the literature is more fully discussed.
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An analytical framework
In our earlier paper (Tallontire 2007) we set out the areas of literature which may
provide ideas for a conceptual framework to guide empirical analysis. The entry point
was Value Chain Analysis (VCA) as it is focused on the structures of international
trade and the material context in which PSIs are emerging. There are four generally
agreed aspects to value chain analysis, consideration of the : a) input-output structure,
b) territorial configuration, c) governance structure and d) institutional framework
(originally Gereffi 1995; and summarized by Ponte 2002, Nielson and Pritchard 2009).
A key feature of some applications of VCA that makes it particularly useful for the
analysis of standards is its concern with governance, particularly chain governance, i.e.
how key players ‘drive’ the chain (Gereffi 1994).
Gereffi distinguished between two types of governance structures: producer-driven
and buyer-driven. In a buyer-driven value chain, typical in the agri-food sector, large
retailers or brand-name companies make the key decisions about the nature of
activities and actors in the chain without actually owning any manufacturing facilities
themselves.6 A theoretical development regarding buyer-driven chains by Gereffi et al
(2005) has sought to refine governance in terms of different forms of relationship
between nodes in the chain, focusing on the transfer of information between the buyer
and the first tier supplier, the extent to which information regarding buyer
requirements can be codified and the capabilities of the supply base. 7
In contrast, Gibbon and Ponte (2005) have pointed to the need to consider ‘whole
chain governance’ rather than considering the largely economic dimensions of
‘functional leadership’ and so relate chain governance to ‘broader narratives about
quality circulating within society more generally’ (Ponte and Gibbon 2005: 3). They
remind us that there are other important players and factors as well as the lead agents,
who may have some influence on the ‘drivers’, such as government bodies, civil
society organisations and different categories of consumers (the latter especially in the
context of product differentiation). They stress that value chains do not operate in ‘an
institutional and regulatory vacuum’, and seek to incorporate international trade
policy and the values and views of society, including consumers.
Gibbon and Ponte (2005) link convention theory and analysis of quality conventions
to their understanding of (whole chain) governance in value chains which helps
broaden and contextualise VCA. However, it is less useful at the producer end of the
value chain and with respect to national standards initiatives particularly the shifting
dynamics between the private sector, the state and civil society in the context of
specific PSIs, in contrast to the standards themselves. We need new tools to consider
horizontal governance, i.e. how these new regulatory institutions involve and affect
6 More recent work has suggested that there are more types of governance than this dualism implies
and different chains in the same market for a commodity may exhibit different levels of driveness, that
is, not all buyers are lead firms in the same way.
7 Their distinction between ‘market’, ‘relational’, ‘modular’, ‘captive’ and ‘hierarchy’ forms of
governance has been used by analysts concerned with governance in fair trade value chains for
example (Barrientos and Smith 2007; Reed 2009).
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others formally or informally involved in setting, monitoring, improving or
implementing such standards at the national level.
Increasingly horizontal aspects of governance in VCA are gaining recognition.
Indeed many researchers have abandoned VCA and have looked to Global Production
Network theories to consider the role of other actors that may shape the nature of
inclusion and exclusion in value chains (see for example Coe et al 2008). Within
VCA, Bolwig et al (2008) have developed a framework for integrating gender,
environmental and poverty dimensions into VCA; earlier Barrientos et al (2003)
linked the gender economy to VCA to explore the often neglected employment
aspects of value chains. More recently, Neilson and Pritchard have sought to re-assert
the importance of an institutional dimension to VCA, arguing that recent
concentration on governance has meant that ‘the approach has little to say on the
complex questions’ related to the differences in how value chains operate across
geographical locations and how governance and institutions within value chains are
‘co-produced’ in a context of ‘struggle’ (2009: 8-9).
We argue that it is necessary to widen the perspective beyond vertical chain
governance, i.e. relations between buyers and suppliers, if we are to understand the
broader implications of PSIs beyond the actors directly involved in the agri-food
value chain. In order to capture the interplay between the different actors involved in
PSIs, we have looked to how Kaplinsky and Morris (2002) use the ‘lens of civic
governance’, and ‘the separation of powers’ to reconsider governance in a value chain
context. They ask who makes the rules and how and associated discourse (legislative
aspects); how conformity is assessed (judicial) and management of participants
including the use of incentives and sanctions (executive). They illustrate this by
exploring how parties internal and external to the chain are involved, comparing with
respect to legislative governance, for example, standards on delivery times (internally
determined) with environmental standards (often externally determined), highlighting
that there may be several actors involved in different aspects of governance. For
Kaplinksy and Morris (2002) uncovering the multiplicity of actors was useful in
identifying where inefficiencies in the chain may occur. In the context of PSIs, the
separation of powers helps to take the analysis of governance beyond a concern with
the vertical dimensions, to include the role of parties other than lead buyers. As we
argue below, however, it is important to get beyond the visible or direct involvement
of different actors in governance to also consider more invisible or discursive forms
of power.
Thus, analysis under the rubric of legislative governance is concerned with the origin
of the standard, exploring the links it has with other standards, both in the public and
private domains. Importantly it is concerned with identifying who is involved, and
those who may be excluded. Is this an industry-only or is it multi-stakeholder? And
what is the basis for participation: is there a constitution outlining the different kinds
of organisation to be represented? Under judicial governance, the focus is on how
compliance is monitored and assessed. Are there formal audit procedures? What is
the relationship with other systems of inspection and conformity assessment,
including public sector systems or extra-territorial systems? Who is able to audit and
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what kinds of auditing systems are favoured? Executive governance is about the
processes of standard implementation and the different tools that are used by the PSI
to ensure that standards are met. What does non-compliance mean for members?
How far down the chain are standards expected to be met? What is the relationship
with actors upstream with regard to efforts to promote implementation of the standard?
An important part of our framework is mapping who is involved in each of these three
governance realms, particularly focusing on the extent and modalities of participation
and representation of key stakeholders. This is particularly useful for understanding
the outputs of politics, the decisions made and rules set and to explore the
characteristic of participants. However, this yields a fairly static picture, there is a
need to supplement this picture of the structures of PSIs with an understanding of the
more subtle processes by which new forms of governance are legitimated, i.e. the way
in which power can be expressed and potentially gained through the shaping of ideas
and discourse. Indeed, governance concerns not only direct power over actors in the
chain or their power as a result of their structural position, but also their discursive
power, or ability to frame the debate (Fuchs and Lederer 2007).8
Thus the preliminary analysis of legislative, executive and judicial governance must
be overlaid with an assessment of different dimensions of power, both overt and softer,
hidden forms of power. This can be done through considering the discourse of the
key actors, the way in which the actors interact or the struggles that may occur (as
highlighted by Neilson and Pritchard [2009]), and through this explore who may act
with agency as opposed to being subject to the power relations within the PSIs.9 Thus,
we aim to explore the ways in which the structural characteristics of a particular value
chain, the agency of key actors, and the associated discourses interact, are contested
and shaped, specifically in relation to the emergence of private standards. An
important question that must be addressed is whether the PSI represents a form of
‘control at a distance’ (Gibbon and Ponte 2005) on the part of lead buyers or whether
it has its own, locally negotiated dynamic.
PSIs and governance in Kenyan horticulture
Our empirical research has involved three main elements through which we have
sought to explore the perspectives of different actors along and associated with the
Kenya-Europe horticulture value chain. We have conducted over fifty key informant
interviews in Europe, predominantly the UK, and in Kenya, including representatives
of Kenyan government, horticultural producers, retailers, private standards bodies,
NGOs and trade unions. Several Kenyan stakeholders also participated in three
8 A discursive power approach tends to focus on ‘the ideational dimension’ of politics and policy and
explores how ‘discursive power shapes perceptions and identifies’ (Fuchs and Lederer 2007: 9). In
some approaches to discursive power, power can become anonymised, which, as Fuchs and Leder (ibid)
note, can mean that one ignores the intentions behind power and indeed the role of actors themselves.
However, a Gramscian interpretation of discursive power highlights the role of agency.
9 Riisgaard (2008) highlights the importance of considering agency beyond the buyers and suppliers in
her analysis of the agency of labour organisations in the Kenyan horticulture sector.
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workshops held in Nairobi in September 2008 which sought to map out different
perspectives concerning private standards and their implementation in Kenya and the
trajectories of different PSIs. This was complemented by twenty nine focus group
discussions with workers employed in horticultural firms which are implementing a
range of private social and GAP standards and eighteen FGDs with smallholders
which have been implementing standards demanded by supermarkets (mostly
GlobalGAP in the case of smallholders)10. Through the worker and smallholder FGDs
we sought to explore awareness of standards and participation and involvement (if
any) of workers or smallholders in debates or action relating to private standards and
local PSIs.
Amongst sub-Saharan countries, Kenya is a significant exporter of horticultural
produce (fresh fruit and vegetables and flowers). Horticulture exports, including
flowers, were over US$330 million in 2002; 135,000 people were directly employed
and 25,000 smallholders involved in the sector (World Bank 2005), with annual
growth rates over 10%, by 2006 exports were over US$ 550 million (Republic of
Kenya 2007). The sector has been the arena for a considerable number of PSIs and
seems to have been a testing ground for different institutional arrangements with
regard to standards and market linkages by donors, NGOs and the private sector. Two
kinds of standard have been prominent: labour standards and standards for good
agricultural practice (GAP), both of which have been implemented as a result of buyer
pressure in the agri-food chain. Pressure from buyers, together with civil society
pressure in the case of labour standards, has resulted in the emergence of two Kenyan
PSIs: (a) KenyaGAP, and (b) Horticulture Ethical Business Initiative (HEBI),
background to which is found in the Boxes 1 and 2.
Box 1: KenyaGAP
KenyaGAP is an initiative to produce a ‘locally-owned’ standard that has been
benchmarked with GlobalGAP.
GlobalGAP, formerly EurepGAP, was established in 1996 as an initiative by retailers
belonging to the Euro-Retailer Fresh Produce Working Group (EUREP) to develop
standards for Good Agricultural Practice (GAP). It was a response to consumer
concerns and European legislation on food safety and also aimed to fill a regulatory
gap. Systems such as GlobalGAP are an effort to demonstrate that a retailer has put
in place appropriate precautions to ensure that safe food is delivered to the consumer
(Fulponi 2006: 9). For UK retailers in particular it is hoped that improved systems for
GAP all along the supply chain would offer a due diligence defence for retailers under
the UK Food Safety Act 1990 (Graffham, Karehu and Macgregor 2007). In particular
European markets, notably the UK, Netherlands and Switzerland, certification
according to GlobalGAP has become the minimum requirement for producers wishing
to sell through the multiple retailers (Henson and Reardon 2005; Jaffee 2005) and
retailers outside of Europe have recently become members.
10 The worker FGDs took place July and December 2008 in Kiambu and Nakuru Districts and the
smallholder FGDs took place between July-October 2008 in Maragua, Kirinyaga and Meru.
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In Kenya the larger producers were able to meet the GlobalGAP standard
independently or by virtue of compliance with the Kenya Flower Council’s (KFC)
standard that was already benchmarked with GlobalGAP. However, it was more
challenging for small to medium producers of horticultural products, indeed there
were concerns in the media, in the industry and across government that the standard
would lead to the exclusion of small producers from these supply chains. This was
particularly heightened in 2004 as GlobalGAP’s deadline for compliance by members
and their suppliers drew closer. This led to the establishment of a National Technical
Working Group in late 2004 to explore the potential for a KenyaGAP standard that
would be more attuned to local conditions. Led by FPEAK (the Fresh Producer
Exporters Association of Kenya), whose members include more medium and small
scale operators compared to KFC, KenyaGAP was private sector led. However,
government bodies have also played an important role in the discussions to redevelop
the FPEAK standard to become KenyaGAP. Donors such as Coleacp PIP and USAID
have helped with finance and advice and technical assistance and training was offered
by NGOs and ‘experts’ (Garbutt 2007; Humphrey 2008).
KenyaGAP achieved benchmarked status in 2007 but few, if any, export companies
have sought KenyaGAP certification. FPEAK are now working on a revised standard,
KenyaGAP Local in collaboration with the Kenyan Bureau of Standards and are
starting to audit their members against the KenyaGAP standard, formerly compliance
with the code was not a condition of membership in FPEAK.
Box 2: Horticulture Ethical Business Institute (HEBI)
HEBI was registered as a legal entity in 2003 as a result of a local and international
civil campaign against workers’ rights violations in horticulture and then interventions
from the UK’s Ethical Trading Initiative (itself a PSI with stakeholders from the
private sector, NGOs and trade unions) and donors (the UK’s Department for
International Development [DFID] and the Dutch Embassy). In anticipation of the
ETI delegation and ‘in fear of losing Kenya’s most significant market, rival Kenyan
stakeholders came together for the first time to lay the groundwork for the formation
of HEBI’ (Dolan and Opondo 2005: 91).
A multi-stakeholder approach to code implementation was initiated and a tri-partite
Stakeholders Steering Committee (SSC) was formed comprised of members from
Kenyan civil society organizations and trade associations/employers, observers
(including donors and some UK-registered NGOs), and government representatives.
The aim was to include unions but have they did not accept the invitation. The SCC
had two objectives to a) ‘harmonise stakeholder interests and involvement and to
develop a credible and participatory social audit framework acceptable to all
stakeholders including buyer markets’ and b) ‘to use the developed social audit
framework to establish the actual situation on the ground and report back to the
Stakeholders’ (HEBI 2005).
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The intervention of the ETI and donor funding helped establish HEBI and by 2005 it
had undertaken the following activities (HEBI 2005):
 Developed a uniform social code of practice, which translated the ETI Base
Code and other significant social codes into the Kenyan context, through
reference to Kenyan labour law and drawing on good practice established
from research and HEBI audits
 Trained up to 40 local auditors in Participatory Social Auditing (PSA)
 Social ethics stakeholder workshop, planned to take place annually
 A pilot social audit took place on eight farms and the findings were presented
at a stakeholder workshop (January 2004).
One of the aspirations of HEBI, as expressed in its terms of reference for the
development of a strategic plan (2006), is ‘the formation of an independent
association of social auditors’; it also indicates that it offers the services of social
auditors. This role as an audit body is in addition to objectives related to awareness-
raising amongst workers, promotion of PSA methodology, being the focal point for
stakeholder engagement regarding national labour standards and the development of a
complaints handling procedure for the industry.
However, currently HEBI has no staff and no funding and exists, if at all, only as a
board.
In the following sections we discuss the two initiatives using the legislative, judicial
and executive framework and also highlight the way in which power and agency have
been exercised by particular stakeholder groups.
Legislative governance
First of all we consider legislative governance with respect to the origin of the
standard, its content and who is involved as members and the way in which they may
participate. Initial conclusions from analysis of legislative governance highlight
similarities and differences in the organisations involved in the two initiatives. As
both initiatives are part of the same value chain one may expect many of the same
players to be involved, most obviously the exporters and importers.
The standard developers in both HEBI and KenyaGAP sought to base their standards
on an understanding of good practice in the local context. The development of the
HEBI standard began with an analysis of existing (external) social standards. Whilst
much of the motivation behind KenyaGAP was to gain acceptance in the market that
local standards were equivalent with GlobalGAP, one of the main players in the
development of the standard claims ‘we didn’t want to bring a foreign document. We
documented what the farmers are doing and from this we developed the minimum of
what you have to do’ (interview).
Both HEBI and KenyaGAP standards refer to national law. Inclusion of national
level detail, particularly locally appropriate indicators, has been important for the
audit process so that there is less room for inconsistent interpretations by auditors not
familiar with local conditions. Both the HEBI code and the KenyaGAP standard
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attempt to interpret international standards for local conditions and have managed in
some cases to get acceptance of equivalence of outcome through divergent means. A
much celebrated success from the KenyaGAP benchmarking process has been
recognition that a locked metal box is adequate storage for small producers who use
only a small amount of pesticide, rather than the building specified in the original
GlobalGAP criteria and indicators. Another significant difference between the
GlobalGAP and KenyaGAP standards is that the latter offers detailed guidance on
how compliance may be achieved. In the words of one stakeholder, GlobalGAP ‘tells
people what they need to do…[but] they do not tell you how to do it. They give you
the exam but no reading material. With KenyaGAP we chose to say how to do it,
which records the farmers need and what form and how to fill it in’ (interview).
As indicated in Box 2, the HEBI code sought to synthesise the social codes prevalent
in the sector and identify best practice as well as linking the principles expressed in
many codes with relevant Kenyan legislation, with a view to promoting not only
compliance with externally defined rules, but also Kenyan law (Dolan and Opondo
2005). Many of the ideas have been gradually accepted as best practice by leading
players in the industry, for example a spokesperson for the Kenya Flower Council
notes how they have ‘borrowed’ the idea of ‘gender committees’ from HEBI’s
elaboration of the non-discrimination principle (interview). However the content of
the code is only half the story for HEBI, the aim is for it to be complemented by a
particular methodology which, according to a civil society stakeholder interviewee
‘helps in getting the truth…Participatory social auditing – you get things you don’t
get with conventional approaches’. (See next section on judicial governance).
Both HEBI and KenyaGAP have been presented as multi-stakeholder, involving
players from the private sector as well as civil society organisations and government.
The development of HEBI can be traced directly to campaigns by local NGOs such as
Kenya Women Workers Organisation (KEWWO), Kenya Human Rights Commission
and Worker Rights Alert, which then linked up with international networks (such as
Women Working Worldwide based in the UK), to raise awareness of the labour rights
issues that were prevalent throughout the horticulture, particularly floriculture,
industry. This meant that exporters and then retailers decided that they could not
longer act defensively but had to act to change practice (Dolan and Opondo 2005;
Hale and Opondo 2005). After years of conflict, NGOs and the private sector came
together to form HEBI.
HEBI thus aimed to bring the private sector to the table with its civil society critics.
A key part of the structure of HEBI was for it to be led by two co-chairs, one from the
private sector and one from civil society. However, since the resignation of a
representative of Kenya Human Rights Commission, leadership was dominated by the
private sector, through a representative of the Agricultural Employers Association and
latterly the Kenya Flower Council. Civil society organisations have not been taken up
the vacated co-chair role, and indeed some civil society members argue that their
participation in the board since 2007 has been frustrated through being given very late
notice of meetings and by requests to help fund the secretariat at levels which the
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NGOs could ill afford (interviews). The end of donor funding and lack of an income
stream meant that the organisation had no office. That the HEBI secretariat was
temporarily housed in the offices of the Kenya Flower Council in 2007-08 is perhaps
indicative of the private sector’s influence over fate of the initiative.
In recent years in GlobalGAP there has been an emphasis on local level interaction
and the public private partnership that is embodied in the ‘national technical working
groups’, such as that behind KenyaGAP. The chair of GlobalGAP stated that it is
‘committed to building strong links to the public sector, and Non Governmental
Organisations through public private partnership projects’.11 One of the leading
exporter associations in horticulture in Kenya that cuts across flowers, vegetable and
fruit, FPEAK has led the development of KenyaGAP, but some NGOs, consultants
and public sector stakeholders have been involved in the discussions.
A very different set of NGOs have been associated with KenyaGAP compared to
HEBI in which advocacy NGOs have predominated. NGOs that have been associated
with KenyaGAP tend to be organisations working on market access for small
producers. For example Fintrac (in its guise of Kenya Horticulture Development
Program) and CARE (both of which are associate members of FPEAK) have been
involved in initiatives to build capacity in GAP and promote certification and are the
local offices of international NGOs, often funded by donors such as USAID.12
Donors (such as DFID, GTZ and the EU-funded Pesticides Initiative Programme)
have been acknowledged as important players in the development of KenyaGAP and
the benchmarking process, not only for funding but also ‘creating a pool of
knowledge’ (Mbithi 2008b).
In presentations on the KenyaGAP process, ‘farmers’ as well as ‘exporters’ are also
listed as an important part of the process with regards to ‘investment, adoption of new
techniques and group co-operation’ (Garbutt 2007). The ‘unique selling point’ of
KenyaGAP is reportedly its focus on interpreting and making GlobalGAP more
accessible for the smaller producer. Increasingly FPEAK has presented itself as an
organisation that can speak for smaller producers, is able to link small and larger
producers and facilitate compliance with market needs (Mbithi 2008 and b;
interviews). Despite recent efforts at ‘outreach’ to the thousands of smaller farmers
who grow much of the fresh vegetable exports, small farmers themselves have not
been involved in development of the KenyaGAP standard. Our focus groups with
smallholders that have achieved GlobalGAP certification revealed that neither they,
nor their representatives, had been directly involved in any national level discussions
about GAP standards, despite connections to NGOs and consultants concerned about
the challenges of access to markets requiring certification. Standards for food safety
and good agricultural practice are presented by KenyaGAP and GlobalGAP, and to a
11 Email to author 28 March 2008
12 Indeed Fintrac was the operating agency for the USAID Kenya Horticulture Development
Programme and the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) hired a consultancy body
to run its Business Services Market Development Programme (BSMDP) which was also highly
involved in building capacity amongst horticultural producers to access markets requiring GAP
certification.
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certain extent by the bilateral donors, largely as a technical matter where stakeholders
admitted to discussions are largely ‘technical experts’, some of whom speak for
smallholders who themselves do not have a voice. Legislative governance within
KenyaGAP is relatively closed, open only to the invited participants.
In theory HEBI has greater claims to be representative of workers whose interests the
initiative purports to promote. However, the issue of a voice for workers and
representation in HEBI has been more complex in practice. The involvement of trade
unions was a critical part of the model on which HEBI was based, which draws on the
experience of the Ethical Trading Initiative as multi-stakeholder initiative (Brown
2005; Dolan and Opondo 2005; Blowfield 2002). However antagonism between the
sectoral union (Kenyan Plantation and Agricultural Workers Union, KPAWU) and
local NGOs has meant that union representatives refused to take the seats on the
Steering Committee reserved for them (Dolan and Opondo 2005) and there has been
no union participation in HEBI Board meetings. Indeed the union has had little
contact with horticulture industry bodies, focusing its attention on the mechanisms for
collective bargaining (interviews). The lack of union participation creates a problem
for the credibility of multi-stakeholder labour standards initiative. As Blowfield and
Dolan note ‘NGOs are designated proxies for workers' interests’ (2008: 16). The
extent to which they have the capacity to act as advocates for workers is as yet
unproven. Despite considerable activity in the flower farm regions, particularly
Naivasha around 2000-02 on the part of several NGOs, and the fact that NGO
members of the HEBI board participated in awareness raising and pilot participatory
audits in 2005-6, including more recent training, our worker FGDs indicated that few
workers were aware of NGOs working on labour issues.13 Indeed workers were more
aware of technical specifications for the produce than their rights.
The conflict between trade unions and NGOs which has characterised much debate
internationally on the role that codes of practice may play in protecting labour rights
(Braun and Gerhart 2005) is particularly acute in Kenyan agriculture. The level of
unionisation on Kenyan commercial farms is relatively low, particularly among
women (Riisgaard 2008; Dolan, Opondo and Smith 2003) 14 and the relationship
between leaders in the union movement and NGOs has been tarnished by conflicts of
personalities and the influence of national politics. NGOs and others (in key
informant interviews and our stakeholder workshops) allege that the union has been
too close to government to properly undertake its role as voice of the workers and the
union jealously protects its official role in ‘social dialogue’.
Furthermore, the development of an effective working relationship between the NGO
and business participants in HEBI has been hampered by a lack of trust. Many of the
local NGOs involved in HEBI have roots in campaigning and there is a history of
antagonism, and indeed conflict. NGOs tell of being thrown off farms when
attempting to train workers of their rights and to mobilise campaigns (interviews and
13 This could be because workers are fearful of mentioning association with NGOs, especially since
KEWWO for example is a membership organisation.
14 However on some flower farms, including some from which we interviewed workers levels of
unionisation are over 80%.
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workshops). The NGOs on the HEBI Board maintain an advocacy stance but some of
the NGOs have since been invited onto farms for training sessions with worker rights,
especially prior to the pilot social audits. Moreover, KEWWO’s recent research for
Women Working Worldwide has acknowledged that significant improvements have
taken place in the industry, particularly on the larger flower farms (Women Working
Worldwide 2007). Despite some thawing in the relationship, further challenges have
emerged. The departure of some key individuals from some civil society
organisations and diverted attention of others (e.g. forays into national politics) has
meant that some of the NGOs central to the formation of HEBI have played a less
direct role in the recent years. Civil society members of HEBI Board talk of ‘coming
back’ to HEBI, but it is not fully clear why they went away. Was it related purely to
capacity issues, or was there a sense that they were being squeezed out of an
organisation that was being left to wither?
Interviewees from Kenyan business have expressed disappointment that HEBI has not
succeeded, some focusing on the loss of key individuals from the Board but also an
apparent ‘bias’ amongst ‘human rights activists’. At our workshop with Kenyan
private sector stakeholders, participants argued that it was the because of the ‘market’
that HEBI was ‘dying’, rather than because of the action or inaction of local business.
Whilst initially a catalyst for the founding of HEBI, some northern private sector
players have tended to distance themselves from what they regard as the political
problems of HEBI. For example, one retailer, suggested: ‘We got the people round
the table, decided that the issues should be solved in Kenya. [But there were] politics.
Trade unions would only get involved if the NGOs were not there. Who owns the
rights of workers? Because they didn’t get the right structure, perhaps it was always
doomed.’
However, if the trade unions and NGOs had been able to work together within HEBI
and if the original NGOs in the initiative had sufficient resources, both human and
financial, would the story have been any different? The answer partly depends on the
way in which the private sector engages with the process, which we will discuss
further under judicial and executive governance below. It should be noted that the
flower companies and KFC have not completely shunned NGOs, rather they have
become more selective with civil society partners. To assist in social auditing KFC
has recruited Africa Now15 to act on its independent certification committee and
several companies have asked this NGO, through its Ethical Business Service, to train
workers or conduct participatory social audits. The private sector, both Kenyan
horticulture firms and UK retailers, variously regard this organisation as ‘respected’;
‘a local resource’; ‘great’; a ‘livelihoods NGO, not advocacy’ (unlike the HEBI
member NGOs) and even ‘is our partner of choice’.
The sustainability of both KenyaGAP and HEBI is affected not only by the
engagement or otherwise of players in Kenya, but also the involvement of donors.
Donors have played an important role in the early stages of both initiatives. Initial
financing for HEBI came from DFID and the Royal Dutch Embassy and was
15 Africa Now is registered in the UK but has a Nairobi office and was one of the original ‘observers’
on the HEBI board rather than being a full member.
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catalysed by the ETI secretariat and corporate members (Brown 2005), but the major
donor did not renew funding when the production of a strategic plan was first delayed
and then thought to be inadequate. The interest of ETI corporate members was not
sustained for long.16
Donors contributed to the process of benchmarking KenyaGAP and have played an
active role more generally in enabling smallholders to meet and be certified against
GlobalGAP (Humphrey 2006 and 2008; raffham, Karehu and Macgregor 2007).
Since benchmarking was achieved, KenyaGAP has been resourced largely through
the efforts of FPEAK. Current donor attention has moved to the standard setters at
the international level rather assisting with local level certification and benchmarking
processes e.g. the Africa Observer/ Smallholder Ambassador.17
The use of outside resources for both initiatives raises questions regarding their
sustainability. Also questions may be raised regarding their democratic legitimacy in
terms of their ability to include all relevant parties. The extent to which those
currently involved in KenyaGAP and also HEBI speak for or heed workers or small
producers may be questioned. Our findings suggest that whilst there is increasing
awareness of standards amongst smaller farmers and workers, there is little sense that
they may have a voice in standard setting even at the national level.
Our analysis of legislative governance highlights how power has been exerted in
terms of how the content of the standards has been developed and more significantly,
who is participating. At first sight, legislative governance with respect to HEBI has
been more open as it is designed to be multi-stakeholder. However, access to the
private standard debate has been claimed by NGOs in HEBI, rather than the process
being fully open. And the space for dialogue has been constrained by the private
sector. In KenyaGAP the space for participation by actors outside the corporate
private sector has been limited to NGOs and consultants deemed to have technical
expertise.
Judicial governance
Judicial governance in relation to private standards is concerned with the auditing
procedure – i.e. what compliance means, how it is assessed and certified. In terms of
judicial governance there are some key differences between our two cases. For
KenyaGAP, certification by an internationally accredited auditor is compulsory; this
is critical if the assessment of compliance is to seen as equivalent to GlobalGAP’s
requirements. The central tool within GlobalGAP, and hence KenyaGAP, is
compliance with the standard, however, the chair of GlobalGAP when interviewed
said that ‘Certification is not the be all and end all….it’s about the practices…’
(interview). In contrast, HEBI places less emphasis on compliance with the standard
than the institutionalisation of an approach to social auditing that tries to raise
awareness of key stakeholders within the industry in order to promote improvements
16 As early as 2006 members of ETI secretariat wondered if HEBI still existed in reality.
17 This initiative funded by DFID and GTZ began in 2007 with the aim of finding ways of increasing
small holder representation in the standard setting process in GlobalGAP, http://www.africa-
observer.info/index.html
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in labour standards, drawing on ideas of participatory social auditing (PSA) (Auret
and Barrientos 2002). PSA focuses on the use of participatory interview techniques,
especially focus groups using diagramming and drama, to elicit the concerns of
workers, in contrast to the structured interview formats and document checks of
standard social auditing (ibid). The model adopted by HEBI also emphasised the
witnessing of audits by civil society as an additional mechanism to improve ability of
social audits to unearth underlying problems and identify solutions (Riisgaard 2008;
workshops).
Whilst there has been wide acceptance of the content of the HEBI standard as a guide
on appropriate criteria and indicators, e.g. by KFC, it is with respect to judicial
governance that there has been more overt conflict. The KFC emphasises how it has
improved its social auditing, e.g. through employment of female lead auditors and
greater use of worker testimony. However, PSA has not been accepted by industry
players beyond initial participation in donor-funded pilots of the audit methodology,
particularly in terms of civil society participation. For the KFC, this has been limited
to one NGO (which is not involved in advocacy) sitting on its recently formed audit
committee.
A recent report by the ETI argues that there is a ‘growing crisis’ in social auditing in
retailer and brand name supply chains (ETI 2007). On the one hand, social auditing is
increasingly seen as wanting as it has not picked up continued labour abuses, even
with respect to criteria that are relatively easy to monitor (such as excessive working
hours) and incidents of audit fraud is increasingly widespread. On the other, there is
also a widening gap between accepted good practice (participatory methods, worker
interviews, inspection of records and triangulation of information) and the way in
which the commercial social audit firms undertake social audits on behalf of retailers.
Most UK retailers now expect their suppliers to submit audit data to SEDEX, the
Supplier Ethical Trade Data Exchange. This ultimately cuts the costs of an audit to
suppliers by minimising duplication but the data handling requirements dictate an
audit format that is quantitative and perfunctory suggest observers, including some in
the private sector. The retailers and certification bodies involved in SEDEX have
developed a standardised social audit methodology, SMETA (SEDEX Member
Ethical Trade Audit) which aims to facilitate transparency and set a baseline in terms
of what social audit should entail. Critics suggest that the SMETA approach is overly
quantitative and reductionist; for example a representative of an ETI member
company disparagingly described the as SMETA ‘five interviews and a photo’.
Another stakeholder pointed out that there is ‘there is no space for trade union and
NGO help in corrective action’ (interviews). . It is far from the PSA that HEBI and
others have developed.
Participatory approaches to social auditing are also threatened by the strengthening of
the GlobalGAP standard’s criteria on worker health, safety and welfare (WHSW)18
and the experimentation with a ‘voluntary module’ on social standards, GRASP
18 Note that WHSW in the GlobalGAP standard is primarily concerned with occupational health rather
than core labour rights.
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(Good risk-based agricultural social practices). GRASP is not a complete social audit
and is described as a 'tested tool to support farmers demonstrating their legal social
compliance with documentary evidence' and can help demonstrate that a good social
management system exists on the farms.19 The emergence of GRASP demonstrates a
managerial or technical approach to labour standards that leaves little room for the
voice of workers. Initial pilots to develop GRASP took place in 2005-6, including a
preliminary test in Kenya and the idea has been revived in the past year as the private
sectors’ interest in more in-depth approaches has waned.
With respect to judicial governance, KenyaGAP has followed GlobalGAP practice,
focusing on the compliance approach. In contrast, HEBI embraced more of a
improving and learning approach to audit, embodied in PSA. HEBI’s audit
methodology has had little uptake and whilst the industry body KFC has indicated
that some of the indicators developed by HEBI have been adopted, the PSA
methodology has not. The limited space for worker and civil society voice in the
dominant forms of social, and indeed food safety, auditing highlights the constraints
on their agency in terms of judicial governance.
Moreover, the evidence available to date also suggests that systems of judicial
governance are relatively immature in that there is little information available on the
right of appeal that the subjects of audit may have. Whilst ‘close out’ meetings at the
end of an audit provide an opportunity to explain non-compliance, the decision of the
certification body, on the recommendation of the auditor, is usually final, though there
is a period of ‘grace’ in which non-compliances can be rectified.20 A source of hidden
power is in the accreditation process for certification bodies; an area for further
investigation would be who decides who can audit and the process by which the
criteria for a credible certification body are determined.
Executive governance
Under executive governance we have considered the expectations of retailers
regarding GAP and labour standards and the response from the suppliers.
Certification with GlobalGAP is a requirement for producers to enter into a supply
relationship with UK (or Dutch) supermarkets. It is the responsibility of the supplier
to pay for and provide evidence of certification but retailers and importers may assist
in the process by providing advice and information, especially for preferred suppliers
(Humphrey 2006: 582). Officially benchmarked standards such as KenyaGAP are
also recognised as proof that the supplier has invested in appropriate systems to
ensure that safe food is delivered. However, it is widely recognised that Kenyan
exporters have not used the benchmarked standard to the exclusion of GlobalGAP
which it is supposed to replace (interviews; Mbithi 2008a). This may cast doubt on
the credibility of the benchmarking process within GlobalGAP. Another explanation
may be sought in interpreting GlobalGAP’s interest in KenyaGAP, if not that of
FPEAK, as a diversionary public relations exercise in the context of critical questions
19 GRASP project final report and interview with one of the project officers, 11 December 2007.
20 HEBI had plans to develop a complaints handling procedure for the industry, but this has not been
realised.
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being asked at the WTO.21 In this light GlobalGAP’s efforts to promote KenyaGAP
can be seen as an effort to demonstrate that GlobalGAP was sensitive to the needs of
developing country producers and not a non-tariff barrier, rather than a serious effort
at benchmarking. For FPEAK, KenyaGAP could also be seen as an exercise in self-
promotion, ensuring it remains relevant as an exporter association, especially in
relation to its sometime rival and sometime partner, KFC, and also to attract funding
from donors interested in promoting market access for small producers (Humphrey
2008).
Most UK supermarkets sourcing from Kenyan suppliers are members of ETI and have
made a commitment to improving labour standards in their supply chain. Social
audits are required, often on the basis of a risk assessment. They are frequently not as
detailed as that dictated by the PSA methodology developed by HEBI, rather in recent
years the SMETA system developed by SEDEX, as discussed above, has become the
dominant approach. Some supermarkets have regular supplier conferences (e.g. one
run by Marks and Spencer in Kenya in October 2008) which aim to explain
expectations with regard to good labour practices. However as indicated by the
continued debates about how purchasing practices constrain the implementation of
codes of practice (Traidcraft 2007), the ethical trade aspirations of retailers do not
always translate to their buying activities. The signals from the retailers to producers
can be mixed, as was apparent from our workshop with exporters and farmers.
Nevertheless many of the Kenyan producers and exporters have of late been active in
their support for social standards, especially when the gaze of civil society has been
on them. Participants in our workshops repeatedly highlighted the growth in Fairtrade
certification amongst flower producers in Kenya as evidence of the importance of
social standards.22 Other stakeholders highlighted however that Fairtrade certification
has been driven by retailers who are responding to consumer demand for a
recognisable label rather than being driven by a social agenda.
But what of the HEBI standard? Even if HEBI’s civil society members and
secretariat had maintained involvement beyond 2007, it seems however, that the
outcome for the organisation may not have been much different given that private
sector players were not prepared to wait for the organisation to mature. Indeed, two
private sector interviewees have indicated:
“By the time there was a multi-stakeholder organisation in Kenya, the industry
had recognised the problems and got on with fixing them … activities by the
big managers of KFC and [UK horticulture companies]; they managed to
squeeze all the social stuff into KFC gold; got the NGO part of Africa Now
21 GlobalGAP, then EurepGAP was the subject of complaints from St Vincent and the Grenadines in
WTO committees highlighting how its requirements were in excess of WTO approved international
Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) standards in June 2005. This has sparked a series of discussions on
private standards at the SPS Committee of the WTO, and currently a Committee work programme
comparing standards (Stanton 2009).
22 Indeed there has been a significant shift in the use of Fairtrade standards in Kenyan floriculture from
one or two firms in 2002 (Dolan et al 2003) to around 18 certified farms and two certified traders in
December 2008 (FLO website; interview).
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involved and Bureau Veritas overseeing. In 8 weeks it was all done and
dusted and HEBI had not even decided where to meet….”
“…[but for the larger retailers], HEBI could not offer the capacity to
audit. …HEBI [had to learn to] fly quite quickly….[but as it took time]
companies have had to use alternatives.”
Other approaches to tackling social issues were seen as more ‘expedient’. HEBI was
quickly side-lined.
Governance and Kenyan PSIs
HEBI and KenyaGAP exist as both standards and institutions with roots in Kenya.
Both initiatives were supported from the outside as part of the trend in the early 2000s
to localise standards which can be seen as a response to the arguments that the
governance of standards was too far removed from the locus of implementation. That
is, they had failed to identify the real issues in the workplace confronting labour (for
HEBI) or were creating a barrier to market access (KenyaGAP). By 2005 HEBI was
legally registered and had a draft strategic plan; KenyaGAP was successfully
benchmarked with GlobalGAP in 2007.
However, both have faced challenges in terms of how they have been accepted by
influential private sector actors. The KenyaGAP standard is not being used as a
certificate that can substitute for GlobalGAP despite the benchmarking process. The
secretariat of FPEAK increasingly speaks about the value of KenyaGAP less in terms
of certification than its strength in promoting good agricultural practices throughout
the industry through the use of supporting tools such as a the quality management
template. By early 2009 public statements focused on KenyaGAP Local, a pared
down standard aimed at promoting safe food in supply chains for local supermarkets
(Mbithi 2009; interviews).
Whilst the content of the HEBI code has had widespread acceptance with parts being
included in auditor guides and checklists used by social auditors operating in Kenya,
the audit methodology recommended by HEBI is heeded by few. Moreover, HEBI
has faced a management and funding crisis; since 2006 HEBI was relatively inactive
as there were problems in recruiting an effective staff for the secretariat and
influential members of the board took on other roles outside of the sector leaving
vacancies. Some of the remaining board members were pre-occupied with
campaigning in the national elections of December 2007 whilst, according to a long-
time member of the HEBI board, ‘new faces at HEBI are grappling with
understanding what HEBI is all about’ (stakeholder interview). The issue seems
rather that there are very different visions of what an organisation like HEBI can and
should be. Indeed, this seemed to have been its problem from the very start.
By mid 2008 civil society board members were committed to reviving HEBI
organisation. They wanted to retain the space for dialogue that had been created but
which they claimed had been ‘killed’ by the private sector. Certainly, there is
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considerable evidence that the vision of HEBI that the civil society organisations has
been quashed by private sector players. We can see this through the power in
legislative governance (cancelled board meetings, appointment of an ineffectual
project manager), and judicial governance (side-lining of PSA) and executive
governance, i.e. by the growers as ‘the market’ did not recognise it. The high profile
of GlobalGAP in Kenya (as a concern of the industry, donors and the government, as
demonstrated by the focus of the National Taskforce on Horticulture) and the
emergence of KenyaGAP have meant that HEBI has been increasingly over-
shadowed; key industry players that were involved in HEBI have been pre-occupied
with dialogue on food safety and GAP. More fundamental however is a lack of
clarity as to the purpose of HEBI: should it be an auditing body or rather a body
aimed at promoting best practice in the work place and remediating problems or
raising awareness of worker rights?
KenyaGAP to date seems to be more adept at reinventing itself. Now that the
GlobalGAP standard has been revised again, meaning that the KenyaGAP standard
needs to be re-benchmarked, FPEAK’s focus has been less on certification than on
advocating a systems-based approach for good agricultural practice that links to
government mechanisms for food safety in the context of domestic as well as export
markets.
Our examination of KenyaGAP and HEBI thorough the lens of legislative, judicial
and executive governance has revealed the interplay of actors both directly and
indirectly involved in the value chain. Certain non-chain actors can play a role in
legislative governance, and, to a certain extent, judicial governance (e.g. donor
support to African certification bodies and raising of the profile, if not acceptance, of
participatory social auditing). Civil society actors have played a role in legislative
governance, shaping the content of the standards particularly at the indicator level,
offering insights into local conditions which can influence how certain criteria are
interpreted by both producers and auditors. Civil society actors involved in HEBI had
hoped to have a role in judicial governance through their promotion of participatory
social auditing. It seems however that certification bodies and the private sector have
taken those aspects of PSA that they find useful and have ignored the more
transformative aspects. However, executive governance, i.e. influencing co-
ordination within the chain and specifically the selection of tools with which to co-
ordinate, which is based on private sector power, tends to be beyond the reach of most
actors involved in the PSIs. Exporters decide ultimately which standards to pursue in
their business, but the factors which ultimately dictate the choice of standard and
mode of their implementation originate further down the chain. The rationale that the
private sector players provide for their choices are couched in the language of
pragmatism and technical requirements. With respect to the participation of civil
society for example, NGOs are seen as a resource, a source of technical expertise,
highlighting a concern with output rather than democratic legitimacy. It is a particular
concern that the space for dialogue has been constrained in a context where trade
union activity has had limited effect.
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Conclusions
This paper reviews and applies an evolving conceptual framework that aims to
examine the governance implications of southern PSIs by bringing together an
expanded value chain framework. Our aim is to facilitate analysis of PSIs that
includes both vertical and horizontal aspects of governance that is able to capture the
political and institutional dynamics of PSIs, in order to get a better picture of how
private standards affect local dynamics and the extent to which players lower down
the value chain, including workers and small producers, are able to influence value
chain governance.
The discussion in this paper has indicated that it is with respect to legislative
governance in particular, and to a lesser extent judicial governance, that the horizontal
dimensions of governance are apparent, that is, a range of actors from outside the
value chain have contributed to debates about the content of standards. However, in
terms of executive governance, the dominance of the ‘vertical’ aspects of governance
is apparent; it is the private sector players who have most influence, though other
actors in the chain, most directly the importers but also other actors such as donors,
through their provision and indeed withdrawal of support for the standards initiatives,
shape the debates. Governance is exercised ‘beyond the vertical’ in that one can
identify wider horizontal processes of governance, including how the scope of key
debates is constructed (especially in legislative governance) but analysis of executive
governance emphasises the dominant role of the lead buyers. Indeed PSIs must be
considered in the context of the other forms of co-ordination in the value chain and in
the context of ‘whole chain governance’.
It seems that the potential of PSIs to enhance democratic governance is limited and is
dependent upon space being granted by private sector players. It seems that only
certain kinds of civil society organisation are welcome to participate in PSIs, ones that
deliver a service to the private sector as auditors or remediate problems, as opposed to
advocacy or representative organisations. However our cases do not suggest that the
role of government is being usurped, on the contrary, the KenyaGAP example
suggests that private governance has stimulated parts of the Kenyan government to act
in a more co-ordinated way to promote the production and sale of safe food. However,
our preliminary analysis of these two PSIs must be supplemented by more detailed
analysis of the discourse around private standards, particularly in the international
context.
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